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Abstract: We investigate experimentally ingratiatory behavior expressed by opinion 
conformity. Both individuals’ performance at a task and their opinions on various topics can 
be observed before unequal payoffs are assigned by a second mover. In some treatments, first 
movers can change their opinion after learning that held by the second mover. We find 
evidence of high ingratiation indices, as opinion conformity is rewarded. However, second 
movers reward conformity less when it is common knowledge that opinions can be 
manipulated strategically. Introducing a monetary cost for changing opinion reduces 
ingratiation. Introducing performance-related pay for the second mover makes ingratiation 
less rewarding but does not eliminate it completely. Reducing the noise in the measurement of 
ability has little effect. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
This paper studies ingratiatory behavior directed at individuals who have discretion in the 
assignment of payoffs. Ingratiation can be defined as “strategic behaviors employed by a 
person to make himself more attractive to another” (Wortman and Linsenmeier, 1977), or as 
“a strategic attempt to get someone to like you in order to obtain compliance with a request” 
(Vaughan and Hogg, 2008).
1
 In a work environment, ingratiation occurs when an employee 
aims to impress his superiors by increasing his attractiveness, particularly when promotions 
are at stake. Using survey data from Forbes 500 companies, Westphal and Stern (2006) show 
that managers use interpersonal influence activity as a substitute for elite credentials to obtain 
boardroom appointments.
2
 Ingratiation can result from various strategies including opinion 
conformity, self-presentation and other-enhancement.
3
 We focus here on the first strategy. 
Ingratiation within organizations has certainly been encouraged by the development of 
subjective appraisals of employees that may leave the door open to favoritism. Prendergast 
and Topel (1996) have modeled favoritism as resulting from the unavailability of objective 
measures of performance and ability. Subjectivity may lead evaluators to reward preferred 
subordinates arbitrarily.
4
 Bandiera et al. (2009) have shown the importance of social 
connections, as managers who are paid a fixed wage tend to favor the employees to whom 
they are socially connected, regardless of their ability. Bramoullé and Goyal (2011) explain, 
however, that favoritism may exist even without introducing managers’ social preferences, as 
                                                
1
 Ingratiation is also thought to be widespread among politicians for the support of voters, citizens for reaching 
priority access to certain facilities, sellers for encouraging customers to buy, individuals for facilitating mating. 
2
 Ingratiation does not necessarily originate in informational asymmetries, in contrast to the influence activities 
modeled by Milgrom (1988) and Milgrom and Roberts (1988). It also differs from collusion within organizations 
(Tirole, 1986), as it does not involve bribing the superior. In contrast to the “Yes Men” theory of Prendergast 
(1993), which provides a rationale for subordinates to conform to their superiors’ opinions by reporting what the 
superiors want to hear about employees’ efforts, ingratiation by opinion conformity is not restricted to 
information that directly influences a firm’s profit. 
3 Opinion conformity consists of expressing preferences supporting the opinion held by a target person; self-
presentation is a means of self-promotion; other-enhancement includes flattering (Jones, 1964).   
4
 A survey, conducted in U.S. companies with over 1,000 employees, indicates that 84% of the 302 senior 
business executives interviewed online report that favoritism exists in their company, and 23% admit they have 
practiced it themselves (Gardner, 2011). Favoritism is defined in this survey as: “Preferential treatment of an 
employee for assignments, credit, opinion, influence, or advancement on the basis of factors that do not directly 
relate to a person’s ability to perform his or her job function, such as background, ideology or gut instincts.” 
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it may allow a social group in which favors are traded to retain more surplus within the group. 
Efferson et al. (2008) have shown that in-group favoritism may help heterogeneous people to 
solve coordination problems. Therefore, on the one hand, favoritism and ingratiation may 
harm the firm’s performance because they pervade the information on which job assignments 
are made. By distorting incentives, they may also discourage the effort of employees. On the 
other hand, favoring opinion proximity may be beneficial if it facilitates communication, 
although it is not certain that this advantage persists if opinions are not sincere. 
To the best of our knowledge, no empirical economic study has so far investigated 
ingratiatory behavior or favoritism based on opinion conformity.
5, 6
 A novelty of our paper is 
that we analyze ingratiation and the influence of opinion proximity on the assignment of 
payoffs, within the same framework. We provide empirical evidence on strategic opinion 
conformity in an environment in which individuals compete for a high payoff assignment 
allocated by an impartial second mover receiving a fixed payoff.
7
 As opinion proximity may 
be interpreted as a signal of reduced social distance, our study also sheds light on 
discriminatory processes based on social distance. 
Since reliable survey data on ingratiation are hardly available, we have designed a 
laboratory experiment in which three individuals have to perform a task that signals their 
ability before a second mover assigns unequal payoffs between the three first movers. In the 
Baseline treatment, the second mover can obtain information on the individuals’ 
performances at the task and on their opinions about a certain topic before assigning the high 
                                                
5
 Empirical tests of favoritism focus on demographic characteristics (Goldin and Rouse, 2000; Knowles et al., 
2001; Fershtman and Gneezy, 2001) or on home bias in sports (Kocher and Sutter, 2004; Garicano et al., 2005) 
and editing (Laband and Piette, 1994). In addition to Bandiera et al. (2009), recent experimental studies have 
investigated in-group/out-group discrimination based on personal relations or social distance in trust games (Falk 
and Zehnder, 2013; Hargreaves Heap and Zizzo, 2009; Brandts and Sola, 2010), bargaining games (Zizzo, 
2011), or competition games (Filippin and Guala, 2013; Dutcher, 2011). On social distance, see Akerlof (1997). 
6
 In contrast, social psychologists have investigated ingratiatory behaviors more frequently. For meta-analyses, 
see notably Gordon (1996) and Higgins et al. (2003) and Appelbaum and Hughes (1998) for a survey. 
7
 This may apply to bureaucratic organizations where superiors have to rate subordinates and where their own 
wage does not depend (at least not directly) on the performance of the promoted subordinates. In a broader 
perspective, the idea was to introduce an impartial third-party like in the theories of justice (see Konow, 2009). 
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payoff to one of them. Indeed, at the beginning of each session, the players have to report 
their opinion on various topics. Comparing the opinions of the first and the second movers 
gives a metric of their proximity. This design allows us to measure the respective weight of 
relative performance and opinion proximity in the assignment of unequal payoffs when no 
incentive scheme guides the second mover’s choice. A meritocratic second mover is likely to 
value more the first dimension, while an opinion-oriented second mover may value more the 
second dimension. 
In the Baseline, first movers cannot change their opinion after learning that of the second 
mover. In contrast, in the Ingratiation treatment they have the option of changing privately 
their opinion before the second mover can ask about it. We exploit this change to identify 
whether second movers are expected to reward opinion proximity and whether their behavior 
differs when it is common knowledge that proximity may result from ingratiation. 
Opinion conformity is, however, not always strategic.
8
 To disentangle ingratiation and a 
taste for conformity or social learning, a Random treatment has been designed. The 
assignment of payoffs is now random and the second mover passive, but first movers are still 
allowed to change their opinions. The comparison with the Ingratiation treatments measures 
the importance of strategic conformity. 
We have designed three additional treatments to test the sensitiveness of ingratiation to 
three interventions. First, we test whether ingratiation resists the introduction of a monetary 
cost for changing one’s opinion. Second, we test the sensitiveness of ingratiation to a 
reduction of the noise in the measure of individuals’ relative ability. Indeed, if this measure 
becomes less noisy, the assignment of payoffs may rely less on opinion proximity, making 
                                                
8 In psychology, conformity is motivated by the search for social approval (Asch, 1951; Cialdini and Goldstein, 
2004). Neuroscientists have shown that the brain analyzes a deviation from the group opinion as a punishment 
(Berns, 2008; Klucharev et al., 2009). Economists give three explanations for conformity. Herding behavior 
(Banerjee, 1992; Scharfstein and Stein, 1990) and informational cascades (Bikhchandani et al., 1992) result from 
informational deficits. Conformity results from the impairment of status in case of departure from a social norm 
(Akerlof, 1980; Jones, 1984; Bernheim, 1994). It creates mutual positive externalities (Katz and Shapiro, 1986). 
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ingratiation less rewarding. Third, we introduce incentives that tie the second mover’s 
compensation to the first movers’ performances. We expect reciprocal second movers to 
reward less (or no longer) opinion proximity and thus ingratiation to decrease (or disappear).  
Our results show that a majority of individuals are willing to change their opinion after 
learning the second mover’s opinion. We find evidence of both a pure taste for conformity 
and strategic conformity. Not all first movers change their opinion, however, which supports 
the idea that changing opinion strategically entails some moral costs. Indeed, ingratiation is 
also less likely when the initially reported strength of opinion is higher. In contrast, 
ingratiation is more likely when opinions are related to a highly debated issue although the 
moral cost of changing this opinion is probably higher, which suggests that ingratiation is not 
only acquisitive (driven by the desire to access resources) but also protective (motivated by 
the willingness to prevent sanctions in case of disagreement) (Jones, 1964).  
Ingratiation does not disappear over time because opinion proximity is rewarded, 
although second movers should be indifferent between first movers in the absence of 
incentives. If a majority of them behave in accordance with a meritocratic principle and 
assign the high payoff to the most able individual, a shorter social distance increases the 
likelihood of getting the high payoff. Second movers discriminate against those who express 
more distant opinions. We interpret this result in terms of value homophily. This notion has 
been conceptualized by Lazarsfeld and Merton (1954) and defined as the tendency to 
associate with other individuals who think in similar ways. Consistently, knowing that first 
movers can conform strategically reduces the influence of opinion proximity.  
Imposing a monetary cost for changing opinion discourages ingratiation. Introducing 
performance-related incentives for the second movers is the policy intervention that increases 
the most the role of relative ability in the assignment of a promotion, relative to opinion 
proximity. This result is consistent with Bandiera et al. (2009) who find that managerial 
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performance pay increases the productivity of high ability employees, especially those who 
have no connection with the manager. However, incentives eliminate neither ingratiation, nor 
discrimination in favor of similarly-oriented individuals. Finally, reducing the noise in the 
measure of ability does not increase the chance of the ablest individual to get the high payoff. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the experimental 
design and our behavioral hypotheses. Section 3 displays the results of the experiment while 
Section 4 discusses these results and concludes. 
2. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN AND BEHAVIORAL HYPOTHESES 
We designed a game with three individuals who have to perform a task and one player who 
has to assign unequal payoffs between the three first movers. The second mover can get 
access to two sets of information before assigning the payoffs: the performance and the 
opinions of the first movers on various topics. 
2.1.  Elicitation of opinions 
In the first part of each session, we elicited the players’ opinions on four topics displayed in 
random order. Two topics are related to tastes and two others are related to highly debated 
issues. After looking at a naïve art painting and listening to a piece of reggae music, the 
players had to rate their taste for the painting and the music on a rating scale ranging from 1 
(“I hate it”) to 100 (“I adore it”). They also had to rate their opinion on two statements: “One 
should introduce a carbon tax to change the course of global warming” and “One should 
regularize illegal immigrants”, between 1 (“extremely unfavorable”) and 100 (“extremely 
favorable”). Players were informed that their responses were anonymous but would be used in 
the next parts of the session with no further information. Since we expect that ingratiation is 
negatively correlated with the strength of one’s opinion (because the moral cost of 
ingratiation is higher if one values more this opinion), they had to indicate the importance of 
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each response on a Likert-type scale between 1 (“I could have answered completely 
differently”) and 10 (“my answer represents a lot to me”). Answers were not incentivized.   
2.2.  Main treatments 
Our experiment included three treatments called Baseline, Ingratiation, and Random.  
The Baseline treatment consists of 12 periods. Each period includes three stages. In the 
first stage, groups of four were formed randomly, including three first movers who have to 
perform a task and one second mover who has to assign payoffs. Roles were kept constant 
throughout the session. First movers were informed about their second mover’s opinion on 
one randomly selected topic, but not on the other first movers’ opinions. 
In the second stage, the first movers had to answer two questions of a quiz on general 
knowledge. Each first mover was only informed of his performance, that is his own number 
of correct answers. It was common information that the random draw of questions was 
independently and identically distributed for each first mover, which is equivalent to 
introducing an idiosyncratic random term in the performance. This performance is not 
intended to measure effort but ability or knowledge.
9
 
In the third stage, the second mover had to assign payoffs to the first movers, namely one 
payoff of 10 points (with 18 points = €1) and two payoffs of 5 points. To determine whether 
the perspective of a higher payoff motivates ingratiation, we force the second mover to assign 
unequal payoffs. This allows us to identify the relative weight of meritocracy (rewarding 
ability) and social distance (rewarding opinion proximity) in the judgment on deservedness. 
In order not to force the second mover’s attention on any information, two buttons were 
available on his computer screen. One button was for asking information about the three first 
movers’ performances and the other one for asking the three first movers’ opinions on the 
                                                
9
 The difficulty of the items in the quiz is variable. Therefore, luck matters. However, subjects received many 
questions and so, on average they were exposed to the same degree of difficulty as were the other subjects. The 
presence of luck does not seem to have reduced the players’ concentration on the task. Intrinsic motivation is 
shown by the fact that mean performances are similar in the treatments with extrinsic incentives (Baseline and 
Ingratiation treatment) and without extrinsic incentives (Random treatment). 
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issue selected in the first stage. Each button was randomly disposed on the left or the right of 
the screen. Second movers could press no button, one or two buttons. Information was free. 
To create impartiality, the second mover was paid a fixed payoff of 12 points. A fixed payoff 
allows us to observe the natural inclination for meritocracy or for opinion proximity relative 
to a random assignment of payoffs. Incentives are introduced in an additional treatment to 
study how they distort this inclination.   
At the end of each period, first movers learned of their own payoff, but not the (absolute 
or relative) opinion and performance of the first mover who got the high payoff. Groups were 
re-matched in the next period. Using a stranger matching protocol eliminates players trying to 
build reciprocal relationships based on favoritism and favor rendering.  
There is only one difference between the Ingratiation treatment and the Baseline: first 
movers were allowed to change their initial opinion before it was made available to the 
second mover and after receiving a feedback on their performance. The second mover knew 
that first movers could modify their opinion but she only observed the reported opinions 
without knowing whether they had been changed or not. As before, first movers did not 
receive any information about other first movers’ opinions or performances. This treatment 
allowed us to determine the importance of ingratiation and its relationship with performance, 
the topic of opinion, and the strength of opinions. Comparing the Baseline and the 
Ingratiation treatments indicates whether the respective weights of relative performances and 
opinions differ when second movers know that opinions can be manipulated strategically. 
First movers may change their opinion strategically but also because they like 
conforming to the opinion of a high status person or because they are uncertain about their 
opinion. To disentangle these strategic and non-strategic reasons, in the Random treatment 
first movers can still change their opinion but second movers are now passive: first movers’ 
payoffs are assigned randomly. In this context, we assume that a change in opinion is driven 
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by a taste for conformity or by social learning, but it is not strategic. Comparing Ingratiation 
and Random treatments indicates to what extent opinion conformity is strategic. In this 
treatment, subjects without any intrinsic motivation should not exert effort at all. 
Each participant played in two treatments (i.e. two times 12 periods): the Ingratiation 
treatment and either the Baseline or the Random treatment. The order of treatments was 
counterbalanced across sessions. 
2.3.  Policy interventions 
We tested in new treatments the sensitiveness of ingratiation to three policy interventions: a 
reduction of the noise in the measurement of relative ability; the introduction of a monetary 
cost for changing opinion; and the introduction of incentives for second movers.  
In the Baseline-No Noise and Ingratiation-No Noise treatments, we increased the 
precision of relative performance measures. The three first movers received the same four 
questions instead of two, which reduced the role of idiosyncratic luck in performances. A 
comparison with the original treatments indicates whether, when performances are more 
informative of ability, opinion conformity is less rewarded than before and thus ingratiation is 
reduced. 
The Ingratiation-Cost and Random-Cost treatments introduced a fixed cost of 1 point for 
changing one’s opinion regardless of the size of the change (it corresponds to 20% of the low 
payoff and 10% of the high payoff). Comparing these treatments with the original ones 
indicates whether ingratiation is cost-sensitive but also whether opinion proximity is rewarded 
more if less ingratiation is expected. 
In the Baseline-Incentives and Ingratiation-Incentives treatments, we tied the second 
mover’s payoff to the sum of the three first movers’ performances. The second mover’s 
payoff function becomes:
 
wm = w0 +γ yk =
k
∑ 10 + 0.5 yk
k=1
3
∑  
10 
 
where wm denotes the second mover’s payoff. The parameter γ ≥0 captures the strength of 
incentives and yk indicates the performance of first mover k. We tested whether, by making 
relative abilities more salient in the payoff function, these incentives lead second movers to 
reward relatively less opinion conformity and consequently reduce ingratiation. Indeed, if 
reciprocity matters, the second mover may be willing to reward the first mover who has got 
the highest performance because this first mover contributes more to the second mover’s 
payoff.
 10
 
2.4.  Behavioral hypotheses 
It is assumed that before assigning the payoffs, the second mover can observe first movers’ 
performance at a task as well as their opinions on some issues. The performance of first 
mover k is given by 
kkk ey ε+=   
where 
k
e  measures the effort exerted by k or his skill, and 
k
ε  is an idiosyncratic random or 
luck component. 
Extending the framework of favoritism studied in Prendergast and Topel (1996) in which 
a manager observes only performance, we write the second mover’s utility as follows: 
um = wm +αwdist + βwperf  
where wdist denotes the payoff of the first mover with the lowest distance between his opinion 
and the opinion of the second mover, and wperf  denotes the payoff of the first mover with the 
highest performance. α ≥ 0 and β ≥ 0 measure the intensity of the second mover’s preference 
for one of the two types of first movers, respectively. Any relationship between α  and β  is 
allowed in the model, and the existing relationship between them determines the type of the 
second mover. More precisely, α > β  characterizes a second mover who values more opinion 
                                                
10
 An alternative would be to link the second mover’s payoff to the performance of the sole first mover who 
receives the high payoff. This would allow us to measure how much money second movers are willing to forego 
to favor opinion conformity instead of ability. Our less direct but perhaps more realistic payoff function enabled 
us to test whether making the reference to performance more salient suffices to reduce favoritism.   
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proximity, with the particular case of the opinion-oriented second mover when β = 0. 
Similarly, β >α  describes a second mover who favors more ability. This second mover is 
called a meritocratic second mover when α = 0. The case when α = β  means that the second 
mover weighs equally both dimensions. An indifferent second mover does not pay attention to 
either performance or opinion and is characterized by α = β = 0 .  
The degree of ingratiation by opinion conformity is measured by the so-called 
ingratiation index, which is defined similarly to the influence index in the framework of 
influence in a social network (Grabisch and Rusinowska, 2009, 2010). Let k
ini
d  denote the 
distance between the initial opinion of the first mover k and the opinion of the second mover, 
and d fin
k  be the distance between the final (reported) opinion of the first mover and the 
opinion of the second mover. For all 0≠
k
ini
d  and dini
k
≥ d fin
k  we define the individual’s 
ingratiation index by  
Ik =
dini
k
− d fin
k
dini
k
∈ [0,1] . 
The higher Ik is, the stronger is the first mover’s ingratiation behavior. Ik=0 reports no 
ingratiation behavior and Ik=1 corresponds to perfect ingratiation. The cost function of 
ingratiation is given by  
k
mo
kkkk
IsccIC ))(()( +=   
where ck is a monetary cost (equal to 0 in all treatments but one). )(scmo
k
 denotes the moral 
cost of ingratiation which we assume to be an increasing function of the strength s of the 
opinion, i.e., the more important his personal opinion on a given topic is to the individual, the 
higher is his moral cost of ingratiation.
11
 Individual k’s utility is defined as follows: 
                                                
11
 The moral cost of ingratiation could be higher if ingratiation was made visible to the other first movers 
because it could generate social disapproval. Here, we assume that expressing a different opinion from that 
initially reported entails a moral cost that increases in the strength of the initial opinion because of self-image 
concerns. Individuals with no self-image may have no moral cost of ingratiation. 
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with the act denoted by k
I k
f  and the cost of effort exerted by the first mover denoted by c(ek). 
If the individual k faces a second mover who favors opinion proximity, α ≠ 0, then the 
probability to get the high payoff increases with a higher Ik. The first mover k has to choose 
his ingratiation index Ik, or equivalently, the distance 
k
find  between his final (reported) opinion 
and the opinion of the second mover, without knowing the type of his second mover (his α 
and β). Consequently, the first mover faces a problem of decision under uncertainty. Let 
),( kfinkk dyπ  denote the expected payoff function to the first mover k. Given his performance, 
the first mover k chooses the ingratiation index Ik that maximizes his expected utility:  
))),(((maxarg , βαβα
k
Ik
I kk
fuE . 
In other words, given his performance 
kkk ey ε+= , k chooses the distance 
k
find  equal to  
( ))()(),(maxarg kkk
k
finkk
d
ecICdy
k
fin
−−π . 
We can prove the following result: 
Proposition 1 
Let 0≠
k
ini
d  and the expected payoff ),( kfinkk dyπ  be decreasing in 
k
find . Then it is optimal for 
the first mover k to ingratiate if the costs of ingratiation are sufficiently low. 
Proof 
Consider a first mover k such that 0≠
k
ini
d  and assume that ),( kfinkk dyπ  is decreasing in 
k
find . 
The ingratiation index corresponding to k
ini
k
fin dd =  is equal to 0 by definition of kI , and 
therefore its cost is 0)0( =
k
C . Consider an arbitrary 
k
find
~
 such that k
ini
k
fin dd <
~
. Let the 
ingratiation index corresponding to such k
find
~
 be denoted by 
k
I
~
. Suppose that 
13 
 
),~()
~
,~()
~
( kinikk
k
finkkkk dydyIC ππ −< , where ky
~  is the performance of k. Since the expected 
payoff is weakly decreasing in the reported distance, the right hand side of the inequality is 
positive. We have )0()~(),~()
~
()~()
~
,~( kk
k
inikkkkk
k
finkk CecdyICecdy −−>−− ππ , which means that 
it is more optimal to the first mover k to ingratiate than to report the initial opinion.  
Based on Proposition 1, we can derive the following hypothesis on the first movers’ 
behavior in the experimental treatments: 
Hypothesis 1: Provided the costs of ingratiation are sufficiently low (or even null if the 
individuals are pure money-maximizers with no self-image concern), the individual should 
report opinions that reduce the distance in opinion with the second mover. The ingratiation 
index should be higher in the Ingratiation treatment than in the Random treatment. 
 
Furthermore, we can show the following: 
Proposition 2 
Increasing the costs of ingratiation, in particular, the strength of the opinion, decreases 
ingratiation.  
Proof 
Let 
k
I
~
 and 
k
I  be the optimal ingratiation indices corresponding to the monetary and moral 
costs )~(~~~ sccc mo
kk
+=  and )(sccc mo
kk
+= , respectively, where cc <~ . Let 0~ >−= ccx .  
We have then: 
k
k
finkkk
k
finkk IcdyIcdy
~),(
~~)
~
,( −≥− ππ  and ( ) ( ) k
k
finkkk
k
finkk IcxdyIcxdy
~~)
~
,(~),( +−≥+− ππ  
and therefore 
kk
II ≥
~
. 
From Proposition 2, the following behavioral hypothesis can be derived: 
Hypothesis 2: Increasing its monetary or moral costs decreases ingratiation. The ingratiation 
index should be lower for the players who report stronger opinions and it should be lower in 
the Ingratiation-Cost treatment than in the initial Ingratiation treatment. 
 
Moreover, we show the following result: 
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Proposition 3 
Let 0≠
k
ini
d  and the expected payoff ),( kfinkk dyπ  be weakly increasing in ky . Moreover, let 
k
π  be differentiable and its derivative 
k
k
y∂
∂π
 with respect to ky  be weakly increasing in 
k
find  
meaning that the smaller is the final distance between opinions, the lower is the marginal 
impact of effort on the first mover’s expected payoff. Then increasing the effort weakly 
decreases ingratiation. 
Proof 
Consider two performance levels ky
~  and ky , where kk yy <
~ . Let 
k
I
~
 and 
k
I  be the 
corresponding optimal ingratiation indices. Let )(sccc mo
kk
+= . We have  
 
k
k
finkkk
k
finkk IcdyIcdy −≥− ),
~(
~
)
~
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Based on Proposition 3, we express the following behavioral hypothesis for first movers 
in the experiment: 
Hypothesis 3: Increasing the performance decreases the ingratiation index. 
On the second mover’s side, as we allow for any relation between 0≥α  and 0≥β , we 
get immediately the following: 
Proposition 4 
There is a coexistence of meritocratic, opinion-oriented and indifferent second movers. 
In the absence of incentives, rational players should assign payoffs randomly. However, 
we are interested in observing if both opinion-oriented and meritocratic second movers exist 
in reality, i.e., if both α > 0 and β > 0 are identified in the experiment, and in which 
proportion. Consequently, based on Proposition 4, we express the following hypothesis: 
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Hypothesis 4: We can observe meritocratic, opinion-oriented and indifferent second movers. 
We make two assumptions on second mover’s preference: 
(A) Introducing the possibility of ingratiation does not increase α . 
(B) Improving the accuracy of the relative performance measure and introducing 
performance pay for second mover do not decrease β .  
These assumptions on α  and β  have natural justifications. We can expect that the intensity 
of the preference for opinion proximity should be lower (or at least not higher) when the 
second mover knows that first movers can change their opinion because these opinions are 
probably less sincere. We can also expect that the intensity of the preference for performance 
should be higher (or at least not lower) when the accuracy of measuring relative performance 
is improved, as the difference in relative performance between first movers now depends 
more on effort and skill and less on personal luck. Similarly, if we link the second mover’s 
payoff to the performance of first movers, then the second mover should not focus less on the 
performances than before. 
Related directly to assumption (A), the following hypothesis will be tested in the 
experiment: 
Hypothesis 5: Knowing the possibility of opinion changes in the Ingratiation treatment 
decreases the weight of opinion proximity in the assignment of the high payoff compared 
with the Baseline. 
  
Except if second movers assign payoffs randomly, in the Baseline-No Noise and the 
Ingratiation-No Noise treatments, the reduction of the noise in the measure of relative ability 
may increase the weight of relative performances in the assignment of payoffs compared with 
the initial treatments. The introduction of incentives in the Baseline-Incentive and the 
Ingratiation-Incentive treatments could also lead second movers to reward opinion proximity 
less than in the initial treatments. Second movers may indeed be willing to reciprocate a 
player with a higher performance because this player contributes more to his own payoff. In 
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contrast, the introduction of a cost for changing one’s opinion in the Ingratiation-Cost 
treatment may reduce the initial difference between the Baseline and the Ingratiation 
treatments, as opinions are more likely to be unchanged and therefore, more truthful. 
In the experiment, the following hypotheses will also be tested: 
Hypothesis 6: A less noisy measure of relative performances and the introduction of 
incentives decrease the weight of opinion proximity in the assignment of payoffs compared 
with the initial treatments. Introducing a cost for changing opinion increases the weight of 
opinion proximity in the assignment of the high payoff compared with the initial Incentive 
treatment, as opinion proximity is less likely to result from ingratiation. 
 
Hypothesis 7: Consequently, when performances are more informative of ability or when 
second mover’s pay is tied to first movers’ performance, ingratiation is reduced as opinion 
proximity is less rewarded than in the initial Ingratiation treatment. 
 
2.5.  Procedures 
The experiment was computerized, using the REGATE-NG software. 29 sessions were 
conducted at the laboratory of the Groupe d’Analyse et de Théorie Economique (GATE), 
Lyon, France, involving 500 undergraduate students from the local Engineering and Business 
schools invited via the ORSEE software (Greiner, 2004). Table A1 in Appendix indicates the 
number of participants and the treatments played in each session. 
Upon arrival, the participants were randomly assigned to a terminal by drawing a tag from 
a bag. Instructions for the elicitation of opinions were distributed and read aloud (see 
Appendix 1). After all of them expressed their opinions on the four issues, instructions were 
distributed for the next part. After checking individually the understanding of the instructions 
by means of a questionnaire, roles were assigned and participants played the 12 periods of a 
given treatment with a random re-matching of groups after each period. Then, the instructions 
for a second treatment were distributed and they played 12 periods of the new treatment.  
 At the end of the session, the payoffs of all the periods were added up and converted into 
euros for payment in cash and in private. Sessions lasted on average 75 minutes and 
participants earned €14.78 on average, including a show-up fee of €4.  
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3. RESULTS  
In this section, we first analyze ingratiatory behavior. Then we study whether and by how 
much opinion conformity matters relative to ability in the assignment of payoffs. In a final 
sub-section we report the results of the policy interventions. 
3.1.  Ingratiatory behavior 
To measure opinion conformity and ingratiation, we compare the initial distance between the 
second mover’s and the first mover’s opinions expressed preliminarily and the final distance 
between opinions after first movers can change opinion. Table 1 reports summary statistics 
for each treatment indicating, for the cases in which initial opinions differ, the number of 
changes in opinions in each direction, the number of observations with perfect or almost 
perfect ingratiation, and the mean ingratiation index. Perfect ingratiation indicates a change in 
opinion designed to match exactly the second mover’s opinion; almost perfect ingratiation 
corresponds to the cases in which the initial distance is higher than 2 and the final distance 
does not exceed 2. The index is calculated as the difference between the initial distance and 
the final distance, divided by the initial distance. It excludes cases in which the final distance 
exceeds the initial distance, which by definition does not correspond to ingratiation. 
Table 1.  Summary statistics 
Treatments Baseline Ingratiation Random 
Same initial opinion as the second 
mover’s 
Different initial opinion 
Total number of observations 
65 (4.75%) 
 
1303 (95.25%) 
1368 (100%) 
130 (4.63%)
ns 
 
2678 (95.37%)
 ns
 
2808 (100%) 
74 (5.14%)
ns
 
 
1366 (94.86%)
 ns
 
1440 (100%) 
Sub-sample of observations with a different initial opinion 
Change between final and initial distance 
- Increased distance 
- Same distance 
- Decreased distance 
Total  
 
- 
1303 (100%) 
- 
1303 (100%) 
 
167 (6.24%) 
995  (37.15%) 
1516 (56.61%) 
2678 (100%) 
 
116 (8.49%)
 
** 
819 (59.96%)* 
431 (31.55%)*** 
1366 (100%) 
Perfect ingratiation (same final opinion) 
Almost perfect ingratiation (same +/- 2) 
- 
- 
301 (11.24%) 
477 (18.57%) 
63 (4.61%)
 ns
  
103 (7.72%)* 
Mean ingratiation index - 0.42 (0.26) 0.19 (0.19)*** 
Note: The Table reports the significance of two-tailed two-sample tests of proportion comparing, in the upper 
part of the Table, each of the Ingratiation and Random treatments with the Baseline, and in the other cases, the 
Random treatment with the Ingratiation treatment. The comparison of ingratiation indices in the last row of the 
Table is based on a two-tailed Mann-Whitney test (M-W, hereafter). All the tests reported in the paper are 
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conducted only on the first period when all observations are still independent. 
ns
 indicates no significance and *, 
**, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.   
Table 1 shows that in the Ingratiation treatment slightly more than one third of the first 
movers keep the same opinion after learning that it differs from that of the second mover, 
while 56.61% of the first movers conform with the second mover’s opinion and 11.24% even 
match the second mover’s opinion perfectly. Most of this behavior is strategic, as in the 
Random treatment less than one third of the first movers reduce the distance in opinions and 
perfect conformism represents only 4.61% of the observations. As a complement, Figure 1 
represents the initial difference between the second and the first mover’s opinions on the x-
axis, and the final difference between opinions on the y-axis, for each period of the game and 
for the Ingratiation and the Random treatments.   
 
Fig.  1.  Distribution of initial and final differences  
between the second mover’s and first mover’s opinions 
 
Figure 1 identifies four situations. The first one corresponds to the cases in which 
individuals do not change opinion. This is represented by the diagonal including the point 
(0,0) where the first and the second movers share the same initial opinion. A second situation 
is represented by the few dots located below (above) the diagonal, when the initial difference 
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is negative (positive): individuals increase distance with the second mover, which can be seen 
as anti-conformism (this is outside the scope of this study). Third, the dots on the horizontal 
line corresponding to a final difference of zero indicate that the first and second movers share 
the same opinion at the end. When the initial difference is not equal to zero, this reveals 
perfect ingratiation or perfect conformism. Fourth, almost all the other cases correspond to 
incomplete ingratiation or conformism. Many individuals change opinion in the Ingratiation 
treatment, while observations lie more on the diagonal in the Random treatment.   
We also find evidence of heterogeneity among the players in terms of consistency of 
behavior over time: some people do not like to change their statements, while others have no 
reluctance to be inconsistent in their opinions. Our indicator of consistency is the distribution 
of first movers according to the number of times they have changed their opinion in the 
Ingratiation treatment to conform to the second mover’s opinion (N=234). Each topic is 
presented three times in a sequence, so individuals may change their opinion between 0 and 3 
times. We find that when the opinion is about the migration topic, 15.38% of the 234 subjects 
in the Ingratiation treatment never changed opinion; 21.80% changed opinion once, 31.62% 
changed it twice and 31.20% changed it systematically. For the carbon tax statement, these 
percentages are 23.50%, 26.07%, 23.93% and 26.50%, respectively. For the music statement, 
they are 26.50%, 23.50%, 23.50% and 26.50%. Finally, for the painting statement, they are 
19.66%, 24.79%, 25.64% and 29.91%. These percentages suggest that the volatility in 
opinion is higher when opinions are about a highly-debated topic.  
Next, we analyze the determinants of ingratiation. We estimate multinomial Logit models 
of the probability for a first mover to increase, keep constant or decrease the distance in 
opinion with the second mover. The reference category is when the first mover does not 
modify his initial opinion. We use these models to predict the probability of each of the 
different possible outcomes since the dependent variable is categorical and can take three 
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values that cannot be ordered in a meaningful way.  Robust standard errors are clustered at the 
first mover level to adjust for possible correlation across time. Indeed, since each participant 
is observed 24 times, the error terms may not be independently and identically distributed, 
which introduces heteroskedasticity. Clustering standard errors can correct for this possible 
bias. In Model (1), we pool the data from the Ingratiation and Random treatments and include 
a dummy variable for the Ingratiation treatment in the independent variables. Model (2) is for 
the Ingratiation treatment and Model (3) for the Random treatment.  
The independent variables include the performance, as ingratiation may be more likely 
when first movers were not able to answer the quiz.
12
 Regarding opinions, we include the 
difference between the second mover’s and the first mover’s initial opinion and its squared 
value to allow for non-linearity, and the strength of the opinion reported in the preliminary 
part. We allow ingratiation to differ according to the topic of opinion, by including a dummy 
variable for each topic (with music as the reference category). To measure whether the ordinal 
position of the first mover’s opinion relative to that of the second mover matters, we include 
“negative initial difference” variables for the immigration and carbon tax statements 
indicating whether the first mover’s policy opinion was less “conservative” than the second 
mover's one. We finally control for the order between treatments (with a dummy variable 
equal to 1 when the Ingratiation treatment was played first), the period in the treatment and 
the first mover’s gender, and we include session dummies.  
Table 2 reports only the marginal effects for the probability of decreasing the distance 
with the second mover’s opinion since only this case corresponds to ingratiation. 
 
 
                                                
12
 We checked preliminarily that performances do not depend on the initial distance in opinion by means of an 
OLS model with robust standard errors clustered at the first mover’s level, in which the independent variables 
include dummy variables for each treatment, the distance in opinions interacted with each topic, the first mover’s 
gender and age, the period, the order of treatments and session dummies. The same model was estimated on each 
treatment separately. The opinion variables were significant in no regression. 
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Table 2. Determinants of the probability of decreasing the distance in opinion with the second 
mover - Multinomial Logit models with robust standard errors clustered at the first mover 
level 
Ref.  = no change in 
distance 
Ingratiation and 
Random treatments (1) 
Ingratiation 
treatment (2) 
Random treatment 
(3) 
Ingratiation treatment 
Performance 
Initial opinion 
difference 
Squared initial opinion 
differ.  
Strength of the  
initial opinion 
Topic: painting 
Topic: migration 
Negative initial 
diff.*migration 
Topic: carbon tax 
Negative initial 
diff.*carbon tax 
Order 
Period 
Female 
Session dummies 
0.268*** (0.030) 
0.007 (0.013) 
0.022*** (0.002) 
 
-0.0002*** (<0.001) 
 
-0.028*** (0.006) 
 
0.029  (0.024) 
0.127*** (0.033) 
-0.119*** (0.040) 
 
0.055  (0.036) 
-0.076* (0.043) 
 
0.059*(0.034) 
0.001 (0.002) 
0.050 (0.041) 
yes 
- 
0.002 (0.015) 
0.026***(0.002) 
 
-0.0002***(<0.001) 
 
-0.027*** (0.006) 
 
0.006 (0.028) 
0.121*** (0.035) 
-0.102** (0.049) 
 
0.074** (0.037) 
-0.122** (0.049) 
 
-0.027 (0.124) 
-0.0001 (0.003) 
0.278 (0.042) 
yes 
- 
0.006 (0.020) 
0.012*** (0.003) 
 
-0.0001***(<0.001) 
 
-0.026***(0.007) 
 
0.064* (0.035) 
0.111**(0.051) 
-0.122**(0.054) 
 
0.004 (0.051) 
0.009(0.065) 
 
-0.096 (0.097) 
0.004 (0.003) 
0.080 (0.056) 
yes 
N (by category) 
Nb of clusters 
Log Pseudolik. 
Wald Chi2 
Prob> Chi2 
Pseudo-R
2
 
4044 (283-1814-1947)  
234 
-3167.353   
444.40 
0.000 
0.128 
2678 (167-995-1516) 
234 
-1997.774 
404.25 
0.000 
0.136 
1366 (116-819-431) 
120 
-1112.616 
137.89 
0.000 
0.075 
Note: Marginal effects are reported with robust standard errors in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. N by category refers to the number of cases in which 
first movers increase the distance, keep the distance stable and decrease the distance, respectively. In Model (1), 
the reference category is the Random treatment. In all models the omitted topic is music. 
 
Model (1) shows that the Ingratiation treatment increases the likelihood of shifting one’s 
opinion towards the second mover by 26.81%, compared to the Random treatment. The 
performance has no effect on this likelihood. In contrast, the probability of reducing the 
distance increases with the initial distance, at a decreasing rate. As predicted, it is lower when 
the participant reported a stronger belief in his opinion. Some topics are more likely to lead to 
ingratiation. The statement about the regularization of illegal immigrants increases by 12.74% 
the likelihood of reducing the distance in opinion. This effect is asymmetric: it vanishes when 
the individual holds opinions that are less conservative than that of the second mover. When 
opinion is about the environmental tax, the first movers who hold a more liberal opinion than 
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their second mover are less likely to conform (-7.57%). For these policy-oriented topics, 
ingratiation/conformism is more likely when the first mover is more conservative than the 
second mover. One interpretation of this asymmetry is in terms of social desirability or 
protective behavior. Subjects may fear that holding an opinion that is more “conservative” 
than that of the second mover will be negatively perceived. Another interpretation could be 
that more conservative people are less ideological and have a lower moral cost in changing 
opinion strategically. In contrast, those who hold less conservative opinions are less likely to 
change their opinion in the direction of greater conservatism.
 13,14
 In Models (2) and (3), the 
impact of the initial distance is 2.57% for each difference point in the Ingratiation treatment 
and 1.19% in the Random treatment. Table 2 also indicates that the probability of increasing 
the distance with the second mover’s opinion is marginally lower when the performance is 
lower (only in the Ingratiation treatment), when the initial distance is higher (but non-
linearly), and when opinions are related to policy issues in the Ingratiation treatment. 
Next, we study the determinants of the ingratiation index. We estimate Tobit models with 
robust standard errors clustered at the first mover level. We use these censored normal 
regression models because the data on the dependent variable are censored both on the left at 
0 (no change in opinion) and on the right at 1 (perfect ingratiation).
15
 Using normal Ordinary 
                                                
13
 This effect is not due to a specific distribution of the differences in initial opinions in this topic relative to the 
other topics (see Figure 1A in Appendix that displays the distribution of differences in opinions for each topic). 
Nor is this due to a difference in the strength of opinion across topics. Two-tailed Wilcoxon tests with the 
subject as one independent unit of observation show that the strength of the opinion is not different between 
music (reference), migration (p=0.780) and carbon tax (p=0.437); opinions about painting are less certain 
(p<0.001). 
14
 Note that excluding from the independent variables the interaction terms between the topic of the statement 
and the direction of the opinion difference keeps these results almost unchanged. In particular, the opinion about 
immigration still increases significantly the probability of conforming to the second mover’s opinion. See Table 
A2 in Appendix. Adding the negative initial difference in the opinion about painting and music to the 
independent variables does not modify the previous results either. The coefficient associated with a more 
positive opinion about music is never significant. The coefficient associated with painting is never significant 
but a more positive opinion than that of the second mover increases the probability of changing opinion 
(significant at the 5% level in model 1 and model 2 and at the 10% level in model 3). Since the negative initial 
difference is not significant for all topics and since its coefficient is sometimes positive and sometimes negative, 
the negative difference for the polemic topic is not an artifact of the econometric analysis. 
15
 We also estimated a two-step model to deal with a potential selection bias. Indeed, the individuals who decide 
to conform may have specific characteristics; explaining the index without taking into account this selection may 
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Least Squares models on the whole sample would provide inconsistent estimates since they 
assume linearity. We exclude anti-conformist individuals and those who have the same initial 
opinion as the manager since they do not ingratiate themselves. The independent variables are 
the same as in Table 2. In particular, the initial difference in opinions allows us to indicate 
whether ingratiation is stronger or weaker when the opinions were initially more distant, 
while the index focuses on the reduction of the difference in relative terms. Model (1) pools 
the data from the Ingratiation and Random treatments; models (2) and (3) analyze each 
treatment separately. Table 3 reports the estimates. 
Table 3. Determinants of the ingratiation index - Tobit models  
Dependent variable: 
Ingratiation index 
 
Ingratiation and 
Random treatments 
(1) 
Ingratiation 
treatment  
(2) 
Random  
treatment  
(3) 
Ingratiation treatment 
Performance 
Strength of the initial opinion 
Initial opinion difference 
Squared initial difference  
Topic: painting 
Topic: migration 
Negative initial diff.*migration 
Topic: carbon tax 
Negative initial diff.*carbon tax 
Order 
Period 
Female 
Session dummies 
Constant 
0.465*** (0.056) 
-0.026 (0.020) 
-0.040*** (0.009) 
0.028***(0.003) 
-0.0002***(<0.001) 
0.035 (0.033) 
0.197*** (0.049) 
-0.218*** (0.066) 
0.072 (0.053) 
-0.087 (0.069) 
0.090* (0.053) 
0.007* (0.003) 
0.066 (0.066) 
yes 
-0.470*** (0.170) 
- 
-0.043* (0.020) 
-0.035*** (0.009) 
0.032***(0.003) 
-0.0003***(<0.001) 
0.023 (0.037) 
0.192*** (0.050) 
-0.198*** (0.068) 
0.083 (0.054) 
-0.108 (0.075) 
-0.020 (0.177) 
0.006 (0.004) 
0.018 (0.067) 
yes 
0.046 (0.155) 
- 
0.007 (0.042) 
-0.054*** (0.017) 
0.021***(0.005) 
-0.0002***(<0.001) 
0.077 (0.062) 
0.209** (0.098) 
-0.276** (0.140) 
0.040 (0.108) 
-0.036 (0.133) 
-0.136 (0.205) 
0.011 (0.008) 
0.191* (0.115) 
yes 
-0.318 (0.236) 
N/ Left-/ right-censored obs. 
Nb of clusters 
Log-pseudolikelihood 
F / Prob>F 
Pseudo R
2
 
3761/ 1814 / 364 
234 
-3261.912 
11.43 / 0.000 
0.106 
2511 / 995 / 301 
234 
-2291.949 
11.58 / 0.000 
0.090 
1250 / 819 / 63 
120 
-923.942 
3.36 / 0.000 
0.059 
Note: Robust standard errors clustered at the first mover level are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. In Model (1), the reference category is the Random 
treatment. In all models the omitted topic is music. 
                                                                                                                                                   
bias the estimates. Therefore, in the first step, we estimated Probit selection models of the probability to conform 
or not, by treatment. Robust standard errors were clustered. We derived from these regressions the Inverse of 
Mill’s Ratio. In the second step, we estimated OLS models in which the dependent variable is the ingratiation 
index, by treatment. The independent variables include the Inverse of Mill’s Ratio estimated in the first step to 
account for the possible selection effect. Since IMR was not significant in these regressions, this indicates that 
there is no selection bias. Therefore, our Tobit models accounting for censored data are the appropriate models.   
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The significantly higher index in the Ingratiation than in the Random treatment (model 
(1)) confirms the presence of strategic conformism. The index is significantly higher when the 
initial difference in opinions is larger; the relationship is not linear. The strength of the initial 
opinion reduces the size of the index in both treatments (models (2) and (3)). In both 
treatments, the index increases when opinions are relative to the immigration statement, at 
least for the first movers who hold a more conservative opinion than the second mover.
16,17
  
Model (2) in Table 3 also shows that the ingratiation index decreases with the 
performance at the task in the Ingratiation treatment. When interaction terms are excluded 
(see Table A3), the coefficient associated with the performance variable is significant at the 
5% level. This indicates a substitution effect between ingratiation and ability: a subject who 
performs poorly revises his opinion to a larger extent than a good performer. This could be 
due to both a strategic motivation and a greater moral license to change his opinion if the 
individual believes that the random draw of questions has been unfavorable to him.
18
 The 
coefficient is, however, small: even a good performer may have a high ingratiation index 
because he does not know about others’ performance. 
As a robustness test, we have also estimated another index of ingratiation that measures 
ingratiation in proportional rather than absolute terms and that can take into account the fact 
that some first movers change their opinion to the opposing view of their second mover’s 
opinion. This alternative index is calculated as: I
alt
 = (final opinion – initial opinion) / (second 
mover’s opinion – initial opinion). If 0<I
alt
<1, then the first mover’s opinion moved toward 
                                                
16
 We estimated the same models on the restricted sample of first movers who strictly reduced the distance in 
opinion. The main differences are an increased level of significance of the performance in the Ingratiation 
treatment (p=0.040) and a loss of significance of the topic variables in both treatments although the negative 
impact of having more liberal opinions on illegal immigration in the Ingratiation treatment is almost significant 
(p=0.107). 
17
 When estimating the same models without the interaction terms between the topic and the direction of the 
difference in opinion, the immigration question still captures a significant positive coefficient except in the 
Random treatment where its coefficient is no longer significant (see model (3) in Table A3 in Appendix). 
Including the negative initial difference in the opinion about painting and about music has the same impact. The 
coefficient associated with a more positive opinion about music is never significant. A more positive opinion 
about the painting increases the index (significant at the 5% level in model 1, at 10% in models 2 and 3). 
18
 We thank an anonymous reviewer for this possible interpretation. 
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the second mover’s opinion. I
alt
=1 corresponds to perfect ingratiation, and 1<I
alt
<2 indicates 
that the first mover’s opinion moved towards the opposite side of the second mover’s opinion, 
while getting closer to it. We have estimated the same models as in Table 3 separately for the 
first movers with 0<I
alt
≤1 and for those with 1<I
alt
≤2, excluding from the independent 
variables the initial distance in opinion since this measure is directly included in the definition 
of the dependent variable (regressions available upon request). When 0<I
alt
≤1, the regressions 
deliver the same qualitative results as Table 3. When 1<I
alt
≤2 (which represents 274 out of 
2,511 observations in the Ingratiation treatment and 50 out of 1,250 in the Random 
treatment), the strength of the initial opinion and the performance are no longer significant. In 
the Ingratiation treatment, the index gets significantly closer to 1 when opinions are relative to 
the immigration statement (coeff.= -0.132, p=0.009). This indicates that for more 
controversial topics, some first movers conform not only by moving closer to the second 
mover but also by going beyond his opinion (a more conservative first mover will become 
even more liberal than his second mover). 
To sum up, our analysis supports these results: 
Result 1. Many individuals – but not all – change their initial opinion strategically after 
learning of the second mover’s opinion. Consistent with hypothesis 1, opinion conformity is 
more likely in the Ingratiation than in the Random treatment in which non-strategic changes 
of opinions may be due to a pure taste for conformity, social desirability or social learning.  
 
Result 2. Supporting hypothesis 2, the ingratiation index is negatively correlated with a 
stronger initial opinion, which may be associated with a higher (unobservable) moral cost of 
conformity. More conservative opinions on debated issues increase ingratiation and 
conformity.  
 
Result 3. Supporting hypothesis 3, there is a small substitution effect between the 
performance at the task and the ingratiation index. First movers with low performance tend to 
revise their opinion more. 
 
We analyze now the determinants of the payoff assignment. 
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3.2.  Determinants of the payoff assignment 
To measure the impact of opinion proximity and ingratiation, we first consider the rate of 
success of a first mover depending on his ranking in the triad, based on his performance and 
on opinion distance. The “performance rank” 1 (3) is assigned to the first mover who gets the 
highest (lowest, respectively) performance; the “opinion rank” 1 (3) is assigned to the first 
mover whose reported opinion is the closest (most distant) to the second mover’s opinion. 
Ranks 2 are assigned to intermediate performances or opinions. In the Baseline, the share of 
best performers who receive the high payoff is 42.49% (56.68% after exclusion of ties among 
the best performers); in the Ingratiation treatment, these percentages are 46.55 (proportion test 
comparing Ingratiation and Baseline in period 1, p=0.993) and 67.57 (p=0.365). Figure 2 
displays the relative frequency of first movers who get the high payoff by ranks and 
treatment. 
   
Fig. 2.  Percentage of first movers receiving the high payoff by ranks and treatment 
For each opinion rank, Figure 2 indicates that having the first performance rank always 
increases the likelihood of receiving the high payoff in the Baseline. But it also shows that for 
any performance rank, having the first opinion rank increases dramatically the probability of 
receiving the high payoff. Only the first opinion rank allows a first mover to earn more than a 
random assignment of payoff regardless of the performance rank, whereas having the first 
performance rank makes the first mover better off than a random assignment only if he also 
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holds the first opinion rank. The Ingratiation treatment rebalances the influence of 
performances and opinions: the first opinion rank is rewarded much less than in the Baseline. 
Now, only the first performance rank allows a first mover to earn more than a random 
assignment, except when he holds the third opinion rank. Second movers put less weight on 
opinions when they expect brown-nosing. 
89.25% of the second movers asked information on both the first movers’ performances 
and opinions in the Baseline; the corresponding values were 95.51% and 82.08% in the 
Ingratiation and the Random treatments, respectively.
19
 We use a Probit model with robust 
standard errors clustered at the second mover level to analyze the probability for the second 
mover of looking at both performances and opinions (dependent variable equal to 1), or not 
(dependent variable equal to 0).
20
 This model shows that this probability is significantly 
higher in the Ingratiation treatment than in the Baseline (p=0.020); it is not different in the 
Random treatment and the Baseline (p=0.443); it is lower for males (p=0.026) and older 
second movers (p<0.001). 
To study the determinants of which first mover receives the high payoff we estimate 
conditional Logit models with fixed effects and robust standard errors clustered at the second 
mover level. Indeed, conditional Logit models allow us to estimate the effects of the choice 
variables on the probability of choosing one particular first mover, conditional on the 
attributes of the choice alternatives, i.e. the characteristics of the other triad members. Fixed 
effect estimates use within-individual differences. The independent variables include 
performance and opinion ranks (Rank 2 being the reference) and dummy variables for a tie in 
the performance Rank 1 or in the opinion Rank 1. A variable interacts with the first ranks in 
both opinion and performance in case of a tie in the performance rank to test whether the 
                                                
19
 The percentage of second movers who ask only information on performances is 5.26% in the Baseline, 1.39% 
in the Ingratiation treatment and 0.21% in the Random treatment. The percentages of those who ask only 
information on opinions are 4.82%, 2.78% and 5.62%, respectively. 0.66%, 0.32% and 12.08% of second 
movers, respectively, do not ask information at all.  
20
 The data are available on request. 
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opinion rank is used to split the tie. A similar variable is built for a tie in the opinion rank. 
The independent variables also include the distance in opinion and a dummy variable 
indicating whether the first mover reports exactly the same opinion as the second mover. We 
also interact the distance in opinion and each topic, and dummy variables indicating a 
negative difference in opinion for the immigration and carbon tax statements (i.e. a less 
conservative opinion of the first mover compared to the second mover). Opinion topics, order, 
periods, session and first mover’s gender variables are not directly included because there is 
no within-group variation. We only include the observations in which second movers looked 
at both performances and opinions.
21
 Table 4 displays the marginal effects of these variables 
in the Baseline (Model (1)) and the Ingratiation treatment (Model (2)). We also report 
regressions excluding ties among the best performers. Excluding ties leaves aside the data 
from the whole triad. 
Table 4 shows that having the best performance in the triad increases the probability of 
receiving the high payoff by 31.82% in the Baseline and by 34.70% in the Ingratiation 
treatment. These effects decrease in the case of ties. Having the lowest performance is 
sanctioned, but only in the Baseline and this is borderline significant. Having the smallest 
opinion distance increases the chance of receiving the high payoff by 22.47% in the Baseline 
and by 9.67% in the Ingratiation treatment (the effects remain when we exclude ties in 
performance rank 1). A higher opinion distance in absolute value is punished in the Baseline 
(the “reported distance in opinion” variable), with an additional effect when opinions are 
about policy topics (“final distance*migration” and “final distance*carbon tax” variables). A 
first mover’s less conservative opinion on migration policy than the second mover’s 
                                                
21
 To control for a possible selection bias, it could be appropriate to use a two-step procedure of estimation, with 
a selection equation estimated by a Probit model of the second mover’s choice to look at both performances and 
opinions. However, it is not possible to estimate a conditional Logit in the second step because the Inverse of the 
Mill’s Ratio (IMR) given by the selection equation does not vary within the group of three first movers. 
Estimating simple Logit models in the second step indicates that the IMR is not significant, showing no evidence 
of a selection bias in the second movers who choose to look at both performances and opinions. Therefore, it is 
appropriate to use the conditional Logit models which results are reported in Table 4. 
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(“negative final distance*migration” variable) is rewarded more than a more conservative 
opinion in the Baseline. In the Ingratiation treatment, second movers pay little attention to the 
absolute value of the difference in opinion since they probably anticipate that the first movers 
may have changed their opinion; a higher difference in opinion is sanctioned only when the 
statement is about the carbon tax. Finally, there is no additional effect of having the first rank 
in case of a tie in the other dimension. 
Table 4. Determinants of which first mover receives the high payoff – Conditional fixed 
effects Logit models with robust standard errors clustered at the second mover level 
Dependent variable:  
Probability of receiving  
the high payoff 
Baseline treatment (1) Ingratiation treatment (2) 
All obs. Excluding ties 
in perf. rank 1 
All obs. Excluding ties 
in perf. rank 1 
Performance rank 1 
 
Tie in performance rank 1 
 
Performance rank 3 
 
Performance rank 1 with a tie in 
opinion rank 1 
Opinion rank 1 
 
Tie in opinion rank 1 
 
Opinion rank 3 
 
Opinion rank 1 with a tie in 
performance rank 1 
Reported distance  
in opinion 
Same opinion as the second mover 
 
Final distance * painting 
 
Final distance * migration 
 
Final distance * carbon tax 
 
Negative final difference* migration 
Negative final difference* carbon tax 
0.318*** 
(0.079) 
-0.233*** 
(0.086) 
-0.123
 a
  
(0.079) 
0.043  
      (0.146) 
0.225***              
(0.058) 
-0.191*  
(0.103) 
-0.017  
(0.070) 
0.049  
(0.089) 
-0.006*** 
(0.002) 
-0.071  
(0.093) 
-0.004  
(0.004) 
-0.006*  
(0.003) 
-0.005*  
(0.003) 
0.199*  
(0.105) 
-0.017  
(0.156) 
0.338*** 
(0.078) 
- 
 
-0.171* 
(0.090) 
0.022  
(0.215) 
0.256*** 
(0.072) 
-0.068  
(0.162) 
0.079  
(0.082) 
- 
 
-0.008*  
(0.004) 
-0.123  
(0.103) 
-0.004  
(0.007) 
-0.0004  
(0.004) 
-0.005  
(0.005) 
0.097  
(0.129) 
-0.031  
(0.223) 
0.347*** 
(0.033) 
-0.217*** 
(0.076) 
-0.056 
 (0.077) 
0.022  
(0.079) 
0.097*** 
(0.031) 
-0.162* 
(0.090) 
-0.021  
(0.039) 
0.039  
(0.044) 
-0.001 
 (0.001) 
0.030  
(0.039) 
-0.002  
(0.002) 
-0.002  
(0.002) 
-0.004** 
(0.002) 
-0.016  
(0.058) 
0.085
a
 
 (0.053) 
0.310*** 
(0.029) 
- 
  
-0.053  
(0.079) 
0.141  
(0.089) 
0.094** 
(0.043) 
-0.151 
 (0.136) 
-0.035  
(0.048) 
- 
 
0.002  
(0.002) 
0.046  
(0.063) 
-0.004  
(0.003) 
-0.007
b
  
(0.004) 
-0.005* 
(0.003) 
-0.097  
(0.088) 
0.118  
(0.073) 
N / Nb of clusters 
Log Pseudolikelihood 
Wald Chi2 
Prob> Chi2 
Pseudo-R2 
1221 / 37 
-277.559 
230.32 
0.0000 
0.379 
552 / 35 
-130.114 
100.68 
0.0000 
0.356 
2682 / 77 
-803.193 
150.74 
0.0000 
0.182 
1259 / 76 
-333.401 
113.30 
0.0000 
0.277 
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Note: Marginal effects are displayed with standard errors of the marginal effects in parentheses. *, **, and *** 
indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.  
a
: significant at the 12% level.  
b
: significant at 
the 10.5% level. 
 
Next, we build a tentative typology of payoff assignment functions. In order to do so, we 
need to estimate the value of the α and β parameters for each second mover. Therefore, we 
estimate for each individual a conditional Logit model of the decision to assign the high 
payoff to a specific first mover with robust standard errors. We include all the periods in 
which the second mover looked at both performances and opinions.
22
 To retain the maximum 
number of observations,
 
we pool the data from the Baseline and Ingratiation treatments.
23
 The 
value of α is given by the marginal effect of opinion rank 1 and the value of β by the marginal 
effect of performance rank 1. We use the combination of these parameters to situate each 
second mover in Figure 3. A dot on the vertical (horizontal) axis means that the second mover 
is influenced by the best rank in performance (opinion) while the marginal effect of the best 
rank in opinion (performance) is not different from 0.  
 
Fig. 3. Distribution of second movers’ α and β (marginal effects of a conditional Logit model) 
The estimates allow us to identify four types with the 71 second movers for whom we 
reach convergence (out of 78). A first group includes 21 second movers (29.58%) who are 
                                                
22
 This excludes one player who looked exclusively at the opinions throughout the game. 
23
 The minimum number of observations is 33 and the maximum 72 by subject. Pooling treatments leads to 
estimate an average of the coefficients for the two treatments. 
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significantly influenced by the best performance rank but not by opinion rank; 20 of them are 
meritocratic second movers (α=0, β>0). A second group includes 24 second movers 
(33.80%) who are influenced by both the performance and the opinion ranks (α>0, β>0). 
Most of them (22) are weakly meritocratic (β>α). The third group includes 11 individuals 
(15.49%) who are only influenced by the best opinion rank. 10 of them are opinion-oriented 
second movers (α>0, β=0). A final group includes 15 indifferent second movers (21.13%) 
who reward no specific dimension (α=β=0). 
We summarize our results as follows: 
Result 4. Only a small proportion of second movers assign payoffs randomly, although they 
receive no incentive to reward ability or opinion conformity. A majority of second movers are 
meritocratic and a large minority favor similarly-oriented first movers. This supports 
hypothesis 4. 
 
Result 5. Supporting hypothesis 5, opinion conformity is more rewarded when ingratiation is 
impossible. In this situation, a higher distance is more sanctioned when first movers’ opinions 
on highly debated policy topics are more conservative.  
 
3.3.  Policy interventions  
Three interventions introduce respectively a variation in the task that facilitates the 
comparison of first movers’ ability, a monetary cost for changing one’s opinion, and 
incentives for second movers. These changes exert no impact on performances (M-W tests on 
the first period data, p>0.50). We first test whether these changes modify ingratiatory 
behavior. Figure 4 and Table A4 in Appendix represent the relative frequency of changes in 
opinion, in the Policy treatments where subjects could change opinion.  
Figure 4 shows a major change after the introduction of a monetary cost for changing 
opinion. The share of first movers who do not modify the opinion distance with the second 
mover increases from 36.82% in the initial Ingratiation treatment to 63.85% in the 
Ingratiation-Cost treatment (however, the difference in the first period of interaction is not 
significant; proportion test, p=0.411), and from 59.78% in the Random treatment to 94.59% 
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in the Random-Cost treatment (first period, proportion test, p=0.004). Such a cost eliminates 
non-strategic conformism and reduces ingratiation. 
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Fig.  4. Relative frequency of changes in opinion, by treatment 
This is confirmed by multinomial Logit regressions in which the dependent variable is the 
probability of a first mover increasing, keeping constant or decreasing the distance in opinion 
with the second mover.
24
 Compared with the initial Ingratiation treatment, the introduction of 
a cost diminishes the probability of shortening the distance in opinion by 37.71%; the other 
manipulations exert no significant impact. Compared with the initial Random treatment, the 
introduction of a cost reduces the probability of conformity by 32.79%. With the initial 
Random treatment as the reference, the probability of ingratiation is increased by 27.08% in 
the initial Ingratiation treatment, 35.34% in the Ingratiation-No Noise treatment, 30.90% in 
the Ingratiation-Incentives treatment; there is no significant difference with the Ingratiation-
Cost treatment. The reduction of the distance remains driven by the initial distance, a lower 
strength of initial opinions, and an opinion related to highly debated topics. These results are 
also supported by Tobit estimates of the ingratiation index (see Table A6 in Appendix).  
                                                
24
 Dummy variables for the new treatments are added to the independent variables included in the models 
reported in Table 2, as well as a variable interacting the performance with the No Noise treatment, since 
performances are measured on a larger scale in this treatment. See Table A5 in Appendix. 
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Finally, we study whether the determinants for which first mover receives the highest 
payoff are affected by the new treatments. Table 5 reports the marginal effects of conditional 
fixed effects Logit models pooling the data from the initial and the new treatments (model (1) 
for the Baseline treatments and model (2) for the Ingratiation treatments), with separate 
regressions excluding ties in performance rank.
25
  
Table 5. Determinants of which first mover receives the high payoff in the initial and the 
Policy treatments – Conditional Logit models with robust standard errors clustered at the 
second mover level 
Dependent variable:  
Probability of receiving  
the high payoff 
Baseline treatments (1) Ingratiation treatments (2) 
All obs. Excluding ties 
in perf. rank 1 
All obs. Excluding ties 
in perf. rank 1 
Performance rank 1 
 
Performance rank 1*No Noise 
treatment 
 
Performance rank 1*Cost treatment 
 
Perf. rank 1*Incentive treatment 
 
Performance rank 3 
 
Performance rank 3*No Noise 
treatment 
 
Performance rank 3*Cost treatment 
 
Perf. rank 3*Incentive treatment 
 
Opinion rank 1 
 
Opinion rank 1*No Noise treatment 
 
Opinion rank 1*Cost treatment 
 
Opinion rank 1*Incentive treatment 
 
Opinion rank 3 
 
Opinion rank 3*No Noise treatment 
 
Opinion rank 3*Cost treatment 
0.328*** 
(0.066) 
0.154 
 (0.137) 
-  
 
0.245** 
(0.099) 
0.012 
 (0.054) 
0.073  
(0.141) 
-  
 
-0.185 
(0.120) 
0.216*** 
(0.031) 
0.033  
(0.102) 
-  
 
-0.008 
(0.077) 
0.001  
(0.074) 
-0.033  
(0.106) 
-  
 
-0.032 
0.320*** 
(0.080) 
0.074 
 (0.133) 
-  
 
0.474*** 
(0.112) 
-0.145* 
(0.079) 
0.149  
(0.223) 
-  
 
-0.438*** 
(0.095) 
0.231*** 
(0.078) 
-0.078  
(0.141) 
-  
 
-0.078  
(0.173) 
0.064  
(0.089) 
-0.042  
(0.105) 
-  
 
-0.173  
0.319*** 
(0.027) 
0.012 
(0.073) 
0.109** 
(0.046) 
0.180*** 
(0.060) 
0.043 
(0.034) 
0.096 
(0.060) 
-0.061 
(0.104) 
-0.068 
(0.182) 
0.099*** 
(0.018) 
0.010 
(0.040) 
-0.042 
(0.069) 
0.113 
(0.054) 
0.002 
(0.027) 
0.071 
(0.051) 
0.016 
(0.058) 
0.015 
0.339*** 
(0.028) 
0.013  
(0.084) 
0.162** 
(0.082) 
0.251*** 
(0.072) 
-0.097  
(0.079) 
0.207**  
(0.095) 
0.123  
(0.134) 
-0.198  
(0.299) 
0.099*** 
(0.036) 
0.083  
(0.065) 
0.040  
(0.098) 
0.012  
(0.109) 
-0.029 
(0.043) 
-0.013  
(0.095) 
0.098  
(0.079) 
-0.130  
                                                
25
 In the Baseline treatments, the share of the best performers who receive the high payoff is 42.49% in the initial 
treatment, 45.99% in No Noise (p=0.933) and 51.56% in Incentives (p=0.004); excluding ties, these values are 
56.68%, 61.54% (p=0.264), and 77.88% (p=0.018), respectively. In the Ingratiation treatments, these proportions 
are 46.55% in the initial treatment, 50.18% in No Noise (p=0.919), 49.45% in Cost and 53.83% in Incentives 
(p<0.001 for both); excluding ties, these percentages are 67.57%, 69.52% (p=0.846), 75.0% (p=0.005), and 
83.62% (p=0.014), respectively. These tests are two-tailed proportion tests in the first period data. 
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Opinion rank 3*Incentive treatment 
 
Distance in opinion 
 
Distance *No Noise treatment 
 
Distance *Cost treatment 
 
Distance *Incentive treatment 
 
(0.111) 
-0.010***  
(0.003) 
0.003  
(0.004) 
-  
 
0.003 
(0.005) 
(0.132) 
-0.008***  
(0.003) 
0.002  
(0.005) 
-  
 
-0.007  
(0.009) 
(0.072) 
-0.003***  
(0.001) 
-0.004  
(0.003) 
-0.004  
(0.003) 
-0.001  
(0.003) 
(0.155) 
-0.003*  
(0.002) 
0.001  
(0.003) 
-0.007**  
(0.003) 
-0.003  
(0.003) 
N / Nb of clusters 
Log Pseudolikelihood 
Wald Chi2 
Prob> Chi2 
Pseudo-R2 
2235 / 70 
-531.908 
269.22 
0.0000 
0.371 
1050 / 66 
-230.145 
1282.63 
0.0000 
0.402 
4797 / 124 
-1331.495 
328.97 
0.0000 
0.242 
2273 / 122 
-542.573 
298.23 
0.0000 
0.348 
Note: Marginal effects are displayed with standard errors in parentheses.  Clustering at the second mover level. 
*, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively 
Table 5 attests to the reinforced importance of holding the best performance rank for 
getting the high payoff in the cost and incentives conditions compared to the initial 
conditions. The weight of the relative performance is increased especially when incentives are 
introduced suggesting that reciprocity plays a role. In these treatments, second movers choose 
more frequently to be informed only on performances (7.46% in the Baseline-Incentives 
treatment vs. 5.26% in the Baseline, proportion test, p=0.039; 11.84% in the Ingratiation-
Incentives treatment vs. 1.39% in the Ingratiation treatment, p<0.001). In contrast, a reduction 
of noise in the measure of ability has no impact, except in a surprising direction for the less 
able first movers in the Ingratiation treatment (model (2), last column). Finally, Table 5 shows 
that the interventions do not affect significantly the importance of the best opinion rank in the 
assignment of payoffs compared with the initial treatments; a larger distance in opinion is still 
sanctioned.
26
  
These findings are summarized as follows: 
Result 6. Introducing a monetary cost to change opinion reduces ingratiation and conformity. 
This supports hypothesis 2. 
                                                
26
 This final finding is slightly different from Bandiera et al. (2009). This could be explained by a different 
sequence of decisions between their study and ours. In Bandiera et al. (2009), managers can favor socially 
connected workers before they start working, through the allocation of workers to the tasks and through the 
allocation of effort among workers. In our experiment, the second mover decides the allocation of payoffs after 
the first mover has performed the task and reported his opinion. 
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Result 7. Reducing the noise in the measure of performance has little effect both on first and 
second movers, contrary to hypothesis 6 and hypothesis 7. Introducing incentives or a cost for 
changing opinion increases the weight of relative ability in the assignment of payoffs. 
Opinion proximity remains, however, rewarded. This supports only partially hypothesis 6. 
 
4. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
Our study confirms in an economically-controlled setting the evidence obtained in social 
psychology of the effect of ingratiation on career success, salary increases, or boardroom 
appointments (Gordon, 1996; Higgins et al., 2003; Westphal and Stern, 2006). It emphasizes 
the importance of social distance in economic behavior, as also shown by studies on 
cooperation (Bandiera et al., 2009) and competition (Dutcher, 2011). Many individuals in our 
experiment conform strategically to the opinion of the person who determines their payoff. 
Ingratiation is reduced when the moral or monetary cost of changing one’s opinion is higher. 
It is more spread when opinions concern highly debated issues. This last result may seem 
surprising, as the moral cost of changing one’s opinion is probably higher when opinion is 
about highly debated issues than about aesthetic-related topics because the individual has 
probably thought more about them. A possible explanation is that individuals fear that a 
difference in opinion is more likely to be sanctioned when opinion is about controversial 
issues. Indeed, Jones (1964) distinguishes between acquisitive ingratiation (driven by the 
desire to access valuable resources at a minimal cost) and protective ingratiation (motivated 
by the willingness to prevent a possible sanction in case of a visible disagreement). 
Individuals conform more to avoid being negatively perceived by the second mover. 
Moreover, protective ingratiation may be easier to justify in one ones’ eyes than acquisitive 
ingratiation that may alter self-image. This probably mitigates the moral cost of ingratiation. 
Ingratiation does not disappear over time as it increases expected payoffs, although 
opinion proximity is less rewarded when performance-pay is introduced. In this case, 
reciprocity could motivate second movers to reward ability more when assigning payoffs. 
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This behavior may be due to various motives. Value homophily (Lazarsfeld and Merton, 
1954) is the most immediate candidate as an explanation, as similarity in values has been 
shown to increase interpersonal attraction (Byrne et al., 1966; Liden and Mitchell, 1988). 
Individuals who share knowledge and tastes are also more likely to interact, notably because 
of ease of communication (Carley, 1991; McPherson et al., 2001). Here, groups are formed 
exogenously and they do not have to coordinate in a joint activity, but homophily could 
explain that individuals reward those who think similarly. This interpretation is supported by 
the fact that opinion proximity is less rewarded when second movers suspect brown-nosing 
and less sincere opinions. Another possible interpretation is that rewarding opinion proximity 
offers an alternative solution to random selection when several first movers achieve a similar 
performance (or to discrimination as a tie-breaking rule, see Filippin and Guala, 2013, and de 
Haan et al., 2011). The first explanation is more likely in our experiment, however, since 
opinion proximity is rewarded even in the absence of ties in performance.  
Naturally, some aspects of our design can be discussed. First, we forced second movers 
to assign unequal payoffs. Letting second movers decide freely on how to share the total 
payoff between the first movers would allow us to test whether ingratiation is a specific 
property of tournament settings. Second, we have considered a working environment without 
incentives for the second mover. Introducing a principal-agent framework would allow us to 
study whether explicit incentives to promote the most able first mover eliminate ingratiation. 
Third, using a quiz gives a measure of first movers’ ability but does not provide information 
about their willingness to exert effort. We also acknowledge that the role of luck in the 
difficulty of the task was important, which may increase ingratiation. A possible extension 
would be to consider a task in which luck does not play any role and in which performance 
depends either on effort or on the pure ability to identify how this would impact ingratiation. 
This would render the experimental setting more like a real organizational setting. The setting 
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could lead to more or as much ingratiation as in the current design, because a subject can 
never be sure that he is the best performer and he could substitute ingratiation for painful 
effort. Alternatively, it could reduce ingratiation if luck can no longer be taken as an excuse 
for brown-nosing or if performance is expected to be rewarded more than opinion proximity 
when the task is more demanding. Fourth, interactions were one-shot in our design. 
Introducing repeated interactions and feedback, in which first mover is rewarded, would 
enable assessing the longer term impact of ingratiation. This impact could be negative on the 
abler first movers who are passed over by less productive first movers. It could be positive on 
favored first movers who may want to justify their better treatment. Finally, making changes 
in opinions visible to others would vary the moral cost of ingratiation. Making them visible to 
the second mover might also influence her subsequent decisions, especially if they imply a 
trusting relationship. 
While we must be cautious about their external validity, our results may have potential 
implications for organizations since they show that both ingratiation and favoritism of opinion 
conformity are frequent and that some policy interventions can be relatively effective. Indeed, 
firms may try to fight against ingratiation and favoritism if they generate inefficiencies. 
Subjective evaluation may discourage employees to report their true opinions to their 
manager and encourage them to spend more effort in ingratiatory activities and less effort in 
productive activities that impact the profit of the firm. More generally, ingratiation may 
reduce the accuracy of information, which may have a detrimental effect on the quality of 
projects. Our experiment indicates that reducing the noise in the measure of performance 
(making evaluations less subjective) cannot reduce ingratiation and favoritism. It suggests 
that it is more effective to make ingratiation more costly in moral and economic terms (by 
making it more visible, for example) and to strengthen the link between managers’ 
compensation and employees’ performance. The theory of yes-men by Prendergast (1993) 
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concluded that when the desire to conform is large, using incentive contracts encourages 
individuals to be dishonest when reporting their information. Our study sheds another light on 
this question and suggests that incentive contracts can reduce both the temptation of managers 
to reward conformity instead of performance, and employees’ ingratiatory behavior. 
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APPENDIX 1 – Instructions for the Ingratiation - Random treatments
  
(Translated from original in 
French. The instructions for the other treatments and sessions are available upon request to the authors) 
We thank you for participating in this experiment on economic decision-making. During this experiment you can 
earn a certain amount of money. All the transactions and payoffs are expressed in points. Your gains in points in 
all the periods of all parts will be added up and converted into Euros according to the following rate:  
18 points = €1 or 1 point = €0.0556  
In addition to the earnings you will make during the experiment, you will receive a €4 show-up fee. Your 
payoffs will be paid to you in cash and in private at the end of the session. All your decisions during the session 
will remain anonymous. You will never have to enter your name in the computer.   
The experiment consists of three parts. These instructions are related to the first part of the experiment. The 
instructions relative to the other parts will be distributed after the first part will have been completed.   
Part 1  
During this part, you will have to answer four questions. Your answers to these questions will be called your 
“preferences”. These four questions will be displayed in a random order. 
Question on painting 
A painting will be displayed on your computer screen during a minimum of 20 seconds and a maximum of two 
minutes. After watching this painting, you will have to indicate how you liked it on a graduated scale from 1 (« I 
hate it») to 100 (« I adore it »).   
Question on music 
You will listen to a piece of music during a minimum of 20 seconds and a maximum of two minutes. After 
listening, you will have to indicate how you liked it on a graduated scale from 1 (« I hate it») to 100 (« I adore 
it »).   
Questions on policy issues  
You will have to express your opinion on two policy issues.  You express your opinion on a graduated scale 
from 1 (« extremely unfavorable») to 100 (« extremely favorable »).   
We ask you to answer these questions with sincerity. Your answers will be used in the second part of the 
experiment.  We remind you that all your answers in this experiment will remain anonymous. When you have 
answered these questions on your preferences, you will have to answer to a series of complementary questions. 
Your answers to these questions will not be used in the remaining of the experiment.   
---- 
It is strictly forbidden to communicate with the other participants throughout the experiment.  Any attempt to 
communicate may lead to the exclusion from the session without any compensation.If you have any question 
related to the first part of the experiment, please raise your hand.  We will answer your questions in private.   
----- 
Part 2 (distributed after part 1 was completed) 
This part consists of 12 periods and involves two roles. During this part, you are either a participant A, or a 
participant B. This role is assigned randomly. It is displayed on your computer screen. You keep the same role 
throughout this part. 
In each period, we form groups of four participants. Each group consists of one participant A and three 
participants B. The composition of groups is rematched randomly at the beginning of each period. In each group, 
the role of participants B is to perform a task. Then, the role of participant A is to decide on the assignment of 
two possible payoffs to participants B. 
o Description of each period 
One period consists of four stages. 
In the first stage, the preference of the participant A expressed in response to one of the four questions in the 
first part (the preference regarding either the painting, the piece of music, or one of the two social issues) is 
displayed on the computer screen of his group members. 
In the second stage, each participant B has to perform a task. This task consists of answering two questions 
randomly drawn from a general knowledge quiz including a hundred items. The questions may differ across 
participants. A few examples are displayed in the Table below. 
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What is the oldest auction house in the world? Christie's / Sotheby's / Bonhams 
Which tennis tournament does not belong to the grand slam? The US Open / the Monte Carlo Masters Series / 
the Wimbledon tournament 
What is the capital of Italy? Paris / Londres / Rome 
The number of correct answers (0, 1 or 2) determines the participant B’s « score » for the current period.  Each 
participant B is informed of his own score. 
In the third stage, each participant B is reminded on his computer screen of the preference he has expressed in 
part 1 in response to the question selected in the first stage. He can change this preference before it is 
communicated to the participant A.   
In the fourth stage, the participant A must decide which of the three participants B will receive a payoff of 10 
points for the period. The two other participants will receive a payoff of 5 points. If he wishes, before making his 
decision, the participant A can be informed on the scores of the three participants B (their number of correct 
answers in the quiz) and/or on the preferences they have expressed in stage 3 regarding the question selected in 
stage 1 of this period.   
o How are payoffs calculated in each period? 
In each group:  
- The participant A earns 12 points.   
- The participant B selected by the participant A earns 10 points. 
- The two other participants B earn 5 points each.   
o What does change from one period to the next?  
At the beginning of each period, the groups of four participants are rematched randomly. There are always one 
participant A and three participants B in each group. Each participant keeps the same role (participant A or 
participant B) in all the periods in this part.The reference question (relative to the painting, the piece of music or 
the two social issues) may change in each period. 
Please read again these instructions. If you have any question, please raise your hand. We will answer your 
questions in private.   
----- 
Part 3 (distributed after part 2 was completed) 
The instructions for the third part of the experiment are similar to the instructions for part 2, except regarding the 
fourth stage. Now, the participant B who receives the payoff of 10 points is selected randomly. 
To summarize:  
- The third part consists of 12 periods.   
- You keep the same role as in the second part. 
- The groups are rematched randomly in each period. 
- In each period, one of the four questions of the first part, relative to the painting, the piece of music or one of 
the social issues, is selected.   
- The participant A’s preference regarding the selected question is displayed on the computer screen of all the 
group members.   
- The participants B perform a task. It consists of answering to two questions extracted from a general 
knowledge quiz and that differ across participants B. The numbers of their correct answers constitute the 
scores of participants B.   
- The participants B can change the preference they have expressed in part 1 relative to the question selected in 
stage 1 of the current period. 
- A random draw determines which of the three participants B will receive the payoff of 10 points in the current 
period. The two other participants B will receive the payoff of 5 points. If he wishes, before the random draw, 
the participant A can be informed on the scores of the three participants B (their number of correct answers in 
the quiz) and/or on the preferences they have expressed in stage 3 regarding the question selected in stage 1 of 
this period.   
Please read again these instructions. If you have any question, please raise your hand. We will answer your 
questions in private. After the 12 periods have been completed, we will ask you to answer a few demographic 
questions. Please remain seated until we invite you to leave the laboratory.   
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APPENDIX 2.  TABLES 
Table A1.  Characteristics of the experimental sessions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Session 
number 
Number of 
participants 
Treatments/order 
1 20 Ingratiation-Baseline 
2 20 Ingratiation-Baseline 
3 20 Ingratiation-Baseline 
4 20 Baseline-Ingratiation 
5 20 Baseline-Ingratiation 
6 16 Baseline-Ingratiation 
7 16 Ingratiation-Baseline 
8 20 Baseline-Ingratiation 
9 20 Ingratiation-Random 
10 20 Random-Ingratiation 
11 16 Random-Ingratiation 
12 12 Ingratiation-Random 
13 20 Ingratiation-Random 
14 16 Ingratiation-Random 
15 20 Ingratiation-Random 
16 16 Random-Ingratiation 
17 20 Random-Ingratiation 
18 12 Ingratiation-Baseline - No Noise 
19 16 Ingratiation-Baseline - No Noise 
20 20 Baseline-Ingratiation - No Noise 
21 12 Baseline-Ingratiation - No Noise 
22 16 Ingratiation-Random - Cost 
23 16 Ingratiation-Random - Cost 
24 20 Ingratiation-Random - Cost 
25 12 Ingratiation-Baseline - Incentives 
26 20 Ingratiation-Baseline - Incentives 
27 16 Ingratiation-Baseline - Incentives 
28 12 Baseline-Ingratiation - Incentives 
29 16 Baseline-Ingratiation - Incentives 
TOTAL 500  
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Table A2. Determinants of the probability of decreasing the distance in opinion without interaction 
terms - Multinomial Logit models with robust standard errors clustered at the first mover level 
Ref.  = no change in 
distance 
Ingratiation and 
Random treatments (1) 
Ingratiation 
treatment 
(2) 
Random treatment 
(3) 
Ingratiation treatment 
Performance 
Initial opinion 
difference 
Squared initial opinion 
differ.  
Strength of the  
initial opinion 
Topic: painting 
Topic: migration 
Topic: carbon tax 
Order 
Period 
Female 
Session dummies 
0.267*** (0.030) 
0.006 (0.013) 
0.022*** (0.002) 
 
-0.0002*** (<0.001) 
 
-0.028*** (0.006) 
 
0.029  (0.024) 
0.063***  (0.024) 
0.018 (0.027) 
0.061* (0.034) 
0.001 (0.002) 
0.052 (0.041) 
yes 
- 
<0.001 (0.015) 
0.026***(0.002) 
 
-0.0002***(<0.001) 
 
-0.029*** (0.006) 
 
0.004 (0.028) 
0.070*** (0.027) 
0.019 (0.029) 
-0.027 (0.123) 
<-0.001 (0.003) 
0.032 (0.042) 
yes 
- 
0.006 (0.020) 
0.012*** (0.003) 
 
-0.0001***(<0.001) 
 
-0.024***(0.007) 
 
0.067* (0.035) 
0.035 (0.037) 
0.009 (0.037) 
-0.096 (0.097) 
0.004 (0.003) 
0.080 (0.056) 
yes 
N (by category) 
Nb of clusters 
Log Pseudolik. 
Wald Chi2 
Prob> Chi2 
Pseudo-R
2
 
4044 (283-1814-1947)  
234 
-3175.780   
424.49 
0.000 
0.125 
2678 (167-995-1516) 
234 
-2005.891 
397.45 
0.000 
0.132 
1366 (116-819-431) 
120 
-1117.721 
123.95 
0.000 
0.070 
Note: Marginal effects are reported with robust standard errors in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. N by category refers to the number of cases in which 
first movers increase the distance, keep the distance stable and decrease the distance, respectively. In Model (1), 
the reference category is the Random treatment. In all models the omitted topic is music. 
 
Table A3. Determinants of the ingratiation index without interaction terms - Tobit models  
Dependent variable: 
Ingratiation index 
 
Ingratiation and 
Random treatments 
(1) 
Ingratiation 
treatment  
(2) 
Random  
treatment  
(3) 
Ingratiation treatment 
Performance 
Strength of the initial opinion 
Initial opinion difference 
Squared initial difference  
Topic: painting 
Topic: migration 
Topic: carbon tax 
Order 
Period 
Female 
Session dummies 
Constant 
0.464*** (0.056) 
-0.028 (0.020) 
-0.039*** (0.009) 
0.029***(0.003) 
-0.0002***(<0.001) 
0.035 (0.033) 
0.083** (0.036) 
0.033 (0.040) 
0.093* (0.053) 
0.007* (0.003) 
0.069 (0.067) 
yes 
-0.479*** (0.171) 
- 
-0.045** (0.021) 
-0.036*** (0.009) 
0.032***(0.003) 
-0.0003***(<0.001) 
0.022 (0.037) 
0.088** (0.037) 
0.035 (0.040) 
-0.026 (0.178) 
0.005 (0.004) 
0.020 (0.068) 
yes 
0.054 (0.154) 
- 
0.005 (0.042) 
-0.051*** (0.016) 
0.022***(0.005) 
-0.0002***(<0.001) 
0.084 (0.062) 
0.066 (0.077) 
0.025 (0.079) 
-0.125 (0.207) 
0.012 (0.008) 
0.195* (0.116) 
yes 
-0.361 (0.236) 
N/ Left-/ right-censored obs. 
Nb of clusters 
Log-pseudolikelihood 
F / Prob>F 
Pseudo R
2
 
3761/ 1814 / 364 
234 
-3272.933 
11.89 / 0.000 
0.103 
2511 / 995 / 301 
234 
-2299.323 
12.06 / 0.000 
0.087 
1250 / 819 / 63 
120 
-927.025 
3.53 / 0.000 
0.056 
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Note: Robust standard errors clustered at the first mover level are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. In Model (1), the reference category is the Random 
treatment. In all models the omitted topic is music. 
 
 
Table A4.  Summary statistics relative to the Policy treatments allowing subjects to change opinions 
Policy treatments 
 
Ingratiation Random 
No Noise Cost Incentives Cost 
Same initial opinion as the 
second mover 
Different initial opinion 
 
Total number of observations 
16  
(2.96%) 
524 
 (97.04%) 
540  
(100%) 
6  
(1.28%)
 
462 
(98.72%)
 
 
468 
(100%) 
56  
(8.19%) 
628 
(91.81%)
 
 
684 
 (100%) 
24  
(5.13%) 
444 
(94.87%)
 
 
468 
 (100%) 
Sub-sample of observations with a different initial opinion  
Change between final and 
initial distance 
- Increased distance 
 
- Same distance 
 
- Decreased distance 
 
Total  
 
 
34 
(6.49%) 
166 
(31.68%) 
324 
(61.83%) 
524 
 (100%) 
 
 
28 
(6.06%) 
295  
(63.85%) 
139 
(30.09%) 
462 
(100%) 
 
 
53 
(8.44%) 
202 
(32.17%) 
373 
(59.39%) 
628 
 (100%) 
 
 
5 
(1.13%) 
420 
(94.59%) 
19 
 (4.28%) 
444  
(100%) 
Perfect ingratiation (same final 
opinion) 
Almost perfect ingratiation 
(same +/- 2) 
40 
(7.63%) 
76 
(14.50%) 
45 
(9.74%) 
57 
 (12.34%) 
78  
(12.42%)
 
  
122  
(19.43%) 
8  
(1.80%)
 
  
11  
(2.48%) 
Mean ingratiation index 0.45 (0.38) 0.26(0.40) 0.44 (0.39) 0.03 (0.17) 
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Table A5.  Determinants of the probability to change opinion distance in Policy treatments - 
Multinomial Logit models with robust standard errors clustered at the first mover level 
Ref.  = no change  
in distance 
Ingratiation and 
Random treatments (1) 
Ingratiation 
treatment 
(2) 
Random treatment 
(3) 
Ingratiation treatment 
Ingratiation No Noise 
Ingratiation Cost 
Ingratiation Incentives 
Random Cost 
Performance 
Perf. in Ingrat.  No Noise 
Initial opinion difference 
Squared initial difference  
Strength of the  
initial opinion 
Topic: painting 
Topic: migration 
Negative  
initial diff.*migration 
Topic: carbon tax 
Negative  
initial diff.*carbon tax 
Order 
Period 
Female 
Session dummies 
0.271*** (0.031) 
0.353*** (0.099) 
-0.154 (0.097) 
0.309***(0.120) 
-0.443***(0.035) 
0.001 (0.011) 
0.014 (0.028) 
0.022***(0.002) 
-0.0002***(<0.0001) 
-0.023***(0.005) 
 
0.011 (0.019) 
0.112*** (0.028) 
-0.082**(0.035) 
 
0.036 (0.028) 
-0.064*(0.035) 
 
0.056*(0.033) 
0.001  (0.002) 
0.041 (0.034) 
yes 
- 
0.098 (0.163) 
-0.377***(0.075) 
0.081 (0.111) 
- 
-0.003 (0.013) 
0.019 (0.029) 
0.028***(0.002) 
-0.0003***(<0.0001) 
-0.021***(0.005) 
 
-0.006 (0.022) 
0.091*** (0.029) 
-0.046 (0.040) 
 
0.042 (0.029) 
-0.079** (0.039) 
 
0.080 (0.143) 
-0.001  (0.002) 
0.032 (0.035) 
yes 
 
- 
- 
 
-0. 328***(0.045) 
0.003 (0.013) 
- 
0.010***(0.002) 
-0.0001***(<0.0001) 
-0.017*** (0.005) 
 
0.040*(0.024) 
0.067*(0.035) 
-0.055 (0.036) 
 
0.002 (0.035) 
0.004 (0.044) 
 
-0.055 (0.066) 
0.003 (0.002) 
0.043 (0.038) 
yes 
N (by category) 
Nb of clusters 
Log Pseudolik. 
Wald Chi2 
Prob> Chi2 
Pseudo-R
2
 
6094 (403-2889-2802)  
375 
-4493.249 
2250.59 
0.0000 
0.172 
4438 (340-1746-2352) 
375 
-3354.998 
729.05 
0.0000 
0.160 
1882 (135-1297-450) 
159 
-1265.501 
198.49 
0.0000 
0.146 
Note: The table reports the marginal effects, with robust standard errors in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. N by category refers to the number of cases in which 
first movers increase the distance, keep the distance stable and decrease the distance, respectively. 
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Table A6.  Determinants of the ingratiation index - Tobit models with robust standard errors clustered 
at the first mover level, with Policy treatments  
 
Dependent variable: 
Ingratiation index 
 
Ingratiation and 
random treatments 
(1) 
Ingratiation 
treatment  
(2) 
Random  
treatment  
(3) 
Ingratiation treatment (initial) 
Ingratiation - No Noise 
Ingratiation - Cost 
Ingratiation - Incentives 
Random - Cost 
Performance 
Perf. in Ingratiation - No Noise 
Strength of the initial opinion 
Initial opinion difference 
Squared initial difference  
Topic: painting 
Topic: migration 
Negative initial diff.*migration 
Topic: carbon tax 
Negative initial diff.*carbon tax 
Order 
Period 
Female 
Session dummies 
Constant 
0.469*** (0.056) 
0.409**(0.189) 
-0.215 (0.204) 
0.536** (0.244) 
-1.150*** (0.231) 
-0.023 (0.018) 
0.056 (0.041) 
-0.031*** (0.008) 
0.029***(0.002) 
-0.0003***(<0.001) 
0.033 (0.027) 
0.195*** (0.042) 
-0.178*** (0.055) 
0.058 (0.041) 
-0.077 (0.055) 
0.092* (0.054) 
0.004 (0.003) 
0.043 (0.055) 
yes 
-0.547*** (0.167) 
- 
-0.140 (0.266) 
-0.619*** (0.191) 
-0.004 (0.166) 
- 
-0.035* (0.019) 
0.066* (0.040) 
-0.027*** (0.007) 
0.032***(0.002) 
-0.0003***(<0.001) 
0.027 (0.029) 
0.188*** (0.043) 
-0.170*** (0.056) 
0.067# (0.041) 
-0.085 (0.058) 
-0.012 (0.209) 
0.004 (0.003) 
0.013 (0.055) 
yes 
-0.048 (0.255) 
- 
- 
- 
- 
-1.563*** (0.318) 
0.007 (0.042) 
- 
-0.048*** (0.017) 
0.021***(0.005) 
-0.0002***(<0.001) 
0.069 (0.065) 
0.244** (0.104) 
-0.236* (0.140) 
0.027 (0.106) 
-0.056 (0.135) 
-0.144 (0.216) 
0.008 (0.008) 
0.162 (0.114) 
yes 
-0.361 (0.243) 
N 
Left-censored obs. 
Right censored obs. 
Nb of clusters 
Log-pseudolikelihood 
F 
Prob>F 
Pseudo R
2
 
5699 
2897 
535 
375 
-4750.003 
13.59 
0.000 
0.137 
4010 
1658 
464 
375 
-3262.138 
11.70 
0.000 
0.090 
1689 
1239 
71 
159 
-1035.176 
5.29 
0.000 
0.120 
 
Note: The data exclude the observations in which the first mover has the same initial opinion as the second 
mover and those in which the first mover increased his distance with the second mover. Robust standard errors 
are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. # indicates 
significance at the 10.5% level. 
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Figure 1A.  Distribution of the frequency of differences in initial opinions between the first and the 
second movers, by topic, all treatments included 
 
